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Solvency ii - Final CEIOPS Advice for Level 2 Implementing Measures on Solvency II: Technical Provisions – Article 86 (d) Calculation of the Risk Margin
 
The reference undertaking
 
A. Assumptions to be fulfilled by the reference undertaking

In order to be able to determine “the cost of providing an amount of eligible own funds equal to the Solvency Capital requirement necessary to support the insurance and reinsurance obligations” (Article 77(5)) in a clear and unambiguous manner, the definition of the reference undertaking is a key issue.
 
The assumptions that the reference undertaking has to fulfil if this object shall be achieved, as well as a rationale for these assumptions, are presented and discussed in the paragraphs below.

Assumption 1:
 
The reference undertaking is not the undertaking itself (i.e. the original undertaking), but another undertaking.
 
This assumption is reasonable in light of the wording of Article 76(2) where reference is made to the current amount a (re)insurance under-taking will have to pay if the (re)insurance obligations are transferred “immediately to another insurance or reinsurance undertaking”.

Moreover, by assuming that the reference undertaking is another undertaking (than the original undertaking) there is no need to make artificial assumptions regarding the original undertaking (e.g. with respect to the available capital of the original undertaking) as was the case in QIS3 –when the reference undertaking was defined as the original undertaking.

In general, it seems reasonable to believe that this assumption will reduce (if not eliminate completely) potential inconsistencies in the framework for risk margin calculations.

Assumption 2:
 
The reference undertaking is an empty undertaking in the sense that it does not have any insurance or reinsurance obligations and any own funds before the transfer takes place.

By making this assumption the risk margin will depend only on the insurance and reinsurance obligations transferred to the reference undertaking and the assets covering these obligations.

On the other hand, if the reference undertaking is assumed to be nonempty there will be ambiguities related to the assumptions to be made regarding (the composition of) the reference undertaking’s assets and liabilities before the transfer takes place.
 
The assumptions made may have a substantial impact on the risk margin due to the fact that the SCR calculations
allow for diversification (correlation effects) between the business existing prior to the transfer and the transferred business.
 
Moreover, if the reference undertaking is assumed to have positive eligible own funds (but no (re)insurance obligations) before the transfer, the risk margin would not measure the cost of holding an amount of eligible own
funds to cover the SCR, but the cost of holding an amount of eligible own funds (at least partially) in excess of the SCR.
 
This is not intended by the definition given in Article 77(5) of the Level 1 text and would not make much sense from an economic point of view.

Assumption 3:
 
After the transfer the reference undertaking has eligible own funds corresponding exactly to the amount of SCR that is necessary to support the transferred insurance and reinsurance obligations.

If the reference undertaking is assumed to be an empty undertaking before the transfer takes place (cf. assumption 2), Article 77(5) can be interpreted in such a way that after the transfer all eligible own funds in this undertaking will be necessary to support the transferred obligations.

On the other hand, if it is assumed that the reference undertaking is nonempty, the interpretation of Article 77(5) will be more difficult, due to the fact that this undertaking will have eligible own funds and be subject to a capital requirement related to its existing business prior to the transfer.

After the transfer the eligible own funds would exceed the amount being necessary to support the transferred obligations.
 
Assumption 4:
 
After the transfer of insurance and reinsurance obligations, the reference undertaking has assets to cover the Best Estimate net of reinsurance and SPVs, the risk margin and the SCR.
 
For the purposes of calculating the risk margin these assets should be considered to minimize the market risk of the undertaking.
 
The reference undertaking should only be subject to market risk that is unavoidable in practice.

After the transfer the reference undertaking will have on its balance sheet both assets covering (re)insurance obligations (technical provisions) and assets covering capital.

In a transfer of (re)insurance obligations, a transfer of assets that cover those obligations will typically also take place.
 
Therefore, immediately after the transfer, part of the assets of the reference undertaking would be formed of assets that originate from the original undertaking. As a result it is possible that there would be market risk linked to those assets.

In this context, it can be assumed that the reference undertaking will derisk these assets in order to reduce the part of SCR related to market risk.
 
For example, the reference undertaking can sell investments in equity or property to avoid the corresponding risks.
 
It can sell corporate bonds and buy government bonds instead to avoid credit spread risk, or it can restructure the investments to achieve a better cash-flow or currency matching and thereby reduce interest rate and currency risk.

In principle, the time needed for this de-risking will depend on the selection of assets that are transferred from the original undertaking. For reasons of practicability it should be assumed that the de-risking takes place immediately after transfer.

On the other hand, Article 76 mentions the transfer of obligations and Article 77 refers to the amount of eligible own funds that would be needed to take over and meet these obligations. Neither of the two articles makes reference to any transferred assets.
 
Therefore it could also be argued that the nature of assets held in the reference undertaking is independent of those of the original undertaking.
 
This would also be supported by the requirement that the assumptions made about the reference undertaking should be harmonised throughout the European Union and that undertaking-specific information should only be used where it better reflects the underlying portfolio characteristics.
 
Hence, even according to this argument it is justified to assume that the reference undertaking covers the transferred obligations with assets that minimise the market risk.

In QIS4, CEIOPS proposed that market risk should not been taken into account in the calculation of the risk margin for reasons of practicability. In many cases this is justified as the assets can be completely de-risked.

However, for particular kinds of insurance obligations not all market risk can be avoided.
 
For example, if the insurance obligations have a very long duration, it may not be possible to match the cash-flows completely.
 
The mismatch may give rise to a significant interest rate risk.
 
Stakeholders noted that the QIS4 approach neglected the unavoidable market risk.
 
For example, the CRO Forum gave in its paper “Market Value of Liabilities for Insurance Firms” the following examples of market risks which cannot be avoided in practice:

(i) 60-year USD, EUR or Yen cash flow or interest rate option,

(ii) 15-year emerging markets cash flow,

(iii) 30-year equity option.

If market risk is excluded from the risk margin calculation also in cases where it cannot be eliminated in practice, the resulting technical provisions would be lower than the transfer value, because any undertaking taking over insurance obligations bearing unavoidable market risk would require a compensation for the risk bearing.
 
The unavoidable market risk can be determined by analysing the possibilities to reduce the SCR for market risk.
 
For example, let CF1, CF2, …, CF30 be the expected cash-flows of an insurance portfolio.
 
Let it be possible in practice to match cash-flows up to 20 years with risk-free instruments but not above this threshold.
 
The reference undertaking could match the cash-flows CF1, …, CF20 and cover the cash-flows CF21, …, CF30 with instruments of 20-year duration.
 
In this way, the market risk would only consist of a residual interest rate risk.
 
Alternatively, the reference
undertaking could match the cash-flows CF21, …, CF30 with corporate bonds or risk-free instruments of another currency (where risk-free instruments of longer duration are available).
 
In these cases, the market risk would only consist of credit spread risk or currency risk. The investment portfolio
with the lowest market risk SCR determines the SCR that needs to be allowed for in the risk margin.

A perfect replication of the liability cash flows is one that completely eliminates all risks (not only market risk) associated with the liability.
 
In practise, perfect replication is expected to be relatively rare.
 
It should therefore be noted that replication of cash-flows and elimination of market risk SCR are different concepts.
 
It is not necessary to perfectly replicate the cash-flows of the obligations to eliminate the market risk SCR. It is sufficient to replicate the liability cash-flows on best estimate level to reduce the standard formula SCR to an immaterial level for the purposes of calculating the risk margin.

For non-life insurance obligations and short-term life insurance obligations the market risk SCR can usually be reduced to zero.

The Level 1 text defines the Cost-of-Capital rate as an additional rate above the risk-free interest rate that an undertaking would incur holding an amount of eligible own funds equal to the SCR.
 
An underlying assumption there is that the assets that cover the SCR provide a return that equals the risk-free interest rate and therefore the cost of holding capital comprises only the additional rate above that.
 
A consequence of this is that there may exist market risk or counterparty default risk linked to these assets.

The market risk or counterparty default risk linked to the assets that cover the SCR depends on the size of the SCR.
 
While the size of the SCR in turn depends on the individual risk modules, there arises a circular definition of the SCR.
 
In order to avoid this, it is assumed that the risk connected to the assets that cover the SCR is zero. This simplifying assumption leads to an understatement of the risk margin but it is useful for practicability reasons.

It is furthermore assumed that both the market risk and the counterparty default risk linked to the assets that cover the risk margin is zero.
 
As the risk margin depends on the SCR and the SCR depends among other things on the risks linked to the assets that cover the risk margin, this would lead to a recursive calculation of the risk margin. However, this risk can be ignored for practicability and materiality reasons.

As with all other risks which are included in the risk margin calculation, the allowance for market risk should be done in a practicable and proportionate way with particular consideration of its materiality.
 
For example, in QIS3 market risk was captured in the calculation by allowing for the current market risk SCR in the first year but not any of the following years of the SCR projection.
 
CEIOPS will give advice on simplifications of the risk margin calculation at a later stage.

Assumption 5:
 
The SCR of the reference undertaking consists of:

(a) underwriting risk with respect to the transferred insurance and reinsurance obligations;

(b) counterparty default risk with respect to ceded reinsurance and SPVs;

(c) operational risk; and

(d) unavoidable market risk.

The reference undertaking is subject to underwriting risk corresponding to the transferred insurance and reinsurance obligations, and these risks exist throughout the lifetime of the obligations.
 
On the other hand, underwriting risk related to new business is not included.
 
With respect to the non-life underwriting risk, the (non-life) catastrophe risk should only include pre-claims obligations (i.e. claims related to catastrophe events incurring after the balance sheet day).

Moreover, it seems reasonable to take into account

• counterparty default risk related to risk mitigation contracts (e.g. reinsurance contracts) covering the transferred insurance and reinsurance obligations; and

• operational risk related to transferred insurance and reinsurance obligations.

However, for reasons of practicability it is assumed that the reference undertaking does not carry any risk of default of counterparties to financial derivatives contracts.
 
Assumption 6:
 
The loss absorbing capacity of technical provisions in the reference undertaking corresponds to those of the original undertaking.

It seems reasonable to assume that the profit sharing commitments of the original undertaking carry over to the reference undertaking as far as they are confined to the line of business.
 
Hence, the risk mitigating effects of future profit sharing should be taken into account to the same extent as in the original undertaking.

Assumption 7:
 
There is no loss absorbing capacity of deferred taxes related to the reference undertaking.

It follows immediately from the assumption that the reference undertaking is an empty undertaking that the loss absorbing capacity of deferred taxes should be excluded from the valuation of the risk margin.

Assumption 8:
 
The insurance and reinsurance obligations of each line of business (as defined in Article 86(e)) are transferred to the empty reference undertaking in isolation.
 
Hence, no diversification benefit between lines of business arises.

For the purpose of determining the risk margin, the SCR of the reference undertaking should be calculated (using a standard formula or internal model) at least by line of business, based on the segmentation laid down by the implementing measures referred to in Article 86(e).

If the SCR of the original undertaking is calculated by using an internal model, the segmentation may differ from the one laid down by the implementing measures referred to in Article 86(e).
 
However, the risk margin shall always be valued at least at the level of lines of business laid down by those implementing measures.

The approach referred to in assumption 8 is reasonable since it is required according to Article 86(e) of the Level 1 text (cf. also Article 80) to calculate this margin (at least) by the individual lines of business.

Especially, there will be no ambiguity involved in the allocation of the risk margin as long as this approach is applied.
The requirement that the (re)insurance obligations of the individual lines of business are transferred in isolation can make the risk margin calculations somewhat more complex (or may at least increase the number of calculations), since it requires the SCR to be calculated by line of business.

However, CEIOPS does not believe that the calculation of the SCR by line of business poses a significant practical problem particularly since the main contribution to the risk margin calculation stems from the SCR for underwriting risk where the relevant input is available by line of business.

Furthermore, as mentioned above simplifications will be introduced in order to make these calculations more feasible.
If instead an approach starting from the risk margin calculations for the overall portfolio – taking into account all possible diversification effects (related to the SCR-calculation) – would be applied, several complicating
aspects would be introduced, including the following:

• It is not obvious how the overall risk margin should be distributed among the individual lines of business. (E.g. the earned premiums will not be a suitable set of weights for the calculations to be carried out in this context.
 
Nor will the best estimate technical provisions (in nonlife insurance) do, cf. the percentages used in the risk margin proxy proposed for QIS4 purposes.)

• If only a part of the (re)insurance obligations (e.g. the obligations related to a single line of business) are transferred from the original undertaking to the reference undertaking, this will require a recalculation of risk margins – both for the portfolio of obligations that are being transferred and for the portfolio of obligations remaining in the original undertaking – and the sum of these risk margins will be higher than the risk margin originally calculated for the overall
portfolio (taking into account all diversification effects).
 
In general, this would mean that after the transfer has been carried out, the risk margin related to the (re)insurance obligations that remain in the original undertaking must be increased.

Since the risk margin depends on the present and future SCRs as calculated per line of business and the margin – in the same manner as the best estimate – in any case shall be calculated per line of business, a natural solution would be to use the same segmentation for the calculation of best estimate technical provisions, risk margins and the SCR,
respectively.

Especially, there seems to be no reason for a (re)insurance undertaking using the standard formula for the SCR-calculations to apply a more granular segmentation than the one that follows from the implementing measures regarding Article 85(e) as this in general will increase the overall risk margin.
 
Moreover, a finer segmentation will lead to laborious recalculations of the (standard) SCR (e.g. per homogenous risk groups) and this may also raise some issues related to the reliability of the (input) data for these calculations.

The requirement that the risk margin should be valued at least at the level of lines of business also in cases where the SCR of the reference undertaking is calculated by an internal model is introduced in order to ensure that all reference undertakings apply the same granularity with respect to these calculations, i.e. in order to avoid ambiguities in the assessing of the relevant technical provisions when a portfolio of (re)insurance obligations is transferred between two undertakings.
 
Moreover, this requirement should be seen as a measure to achieve harmonisation of the (calculated) technical provisions between undertakings, including improved comparability etc. (see also assumption 9 hereunder).
 
Assumption 9:
 
The internal model of the original undertaking (partial or full) can be used to measure the SCR of the reference undertaking to the extent that these models cover at least the risks referred to in assumption 5 as defined by the standard formula.

When Article 77(5) of the Level 1 text refers to the “amount of eligible own funds equal to the Solvency Capital Requirement necessary to support the insurance and reinsurance obligations” it does not distinguish between
SCR calculations based on the standard model and internal models, respectively.

Hence it may be argued that the SCR-calculations to be applied in the Cost-of-Capital assessment can be based on either the standard model or internal models.
 
An argument in favour of applying SCR calculations based on internal models when determining the risk margin, may be that these models are designed in order to capture the risk of the portfolio in question (i.e. the portfolio of the original undertaking) in a better way.
 
However, if an internal model portrays levels of risks that are specific for the original undertaking but cannot be assumed to be similar for the reference undertaking, this may be an argument for not relying on internal model calculations when determining the risk margin.
 
Hence, some conditions should be in place with respect to using SCR-results from internal models in the risk margin calculations.

In general an internal model is approved for the calculation of the current SCR, while the determination of the risk margin requires the calculation of all future SCRs as well.
 
However, an approved internal model may not be fully adequate for the latter calculations.

Assumption 10:
 
The Cost-of-Capital risk margin is defined net of reinsurance and SPVs.

This assumption is consistent with assumption 5 regarding the SCR calculations to be carried out for the reference undertaking and especially the calculation of the partial SCR for underwriting risk as this partial SCR is only calculated net of reinsurance and SPVs.

A requirement to calculate the risk margin also gross of reinsurance would imply a doubling of the number of calculations regarding future SCRs for underwriting risk and these gross calculations would be relevant only for
the determination of the risk margin.

Moreover, a likely consequence of calculating the risk margin both gross and net of reinsurance could be that a (positive) risk margin is attached also to the reinsurance assets (the reinsurance recoverables), when these results are presented in the financial statement (of the original undertaking).

However, this would probably not be in line with the accounting standards for insurance contracts, see e.g. the relevant provisions in IFRS4 regarding valuation of reinsurance assets.

 
The Cost-of-Capital rate
A general approach for stipulating the Cost-of-Capital rate

According to Article 77(5) of the Level 1 text the Cost-of-Capital rate “shall be the same for all insurance and reinsurance undertakings and shall be reviewed periodically”.
 
Moreover, the Cost-of-Capital rate used shall be equal to the additional rate, above the relevant risk-free interest rate, that an insurance or reinsurance undertaking would incur holding an amount of eligible own funds, […], equal to the Solvency Capital Requirement necessary to support the insurance and reinsurance obligation […].

As the “additional rate, above the relevant risk-free interest rate” referred to in Article 77(5) shall be the same for all insurance and reinsurance undertakings, it should be calibrated in a manner that is consistent with the assumptions made for the reference undertaking.
 
In practise this means that the Cost-of-Capital rate should be consistent with the Value-at-Risk-assumption corresponding to a confidence level of 99.5 per cent over the stipulated one-year time horizon as laid down for the calculation of the Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR).
 
Especially, the Cost-of-Capital rate should be independent of the actual solvency position of the original undertaking.

In the third and fourth Quantitative Impact Study for Solvency II (QIS3 and QIS4) the Cost-of-Capital rate had been fixed at 6 per cent as such a rate has been assumed to reflect the cost of holding an amount of eligible own funds for an insurance or reinsurance undertaking being capitalised corresponding to a confidence level of 99.5 per cent Value-at-Risk over a one year time horizon.

The required consistency between the stipulated Cost-of-Capital rate and the (Value-at-Risk) assumptions for the SCR-calculations was explained as follows: the 6 per cent Cost-of-Capital rate corresponds to the cost of providing eligible own funds for BBB-rated insurance or reinsurance undertakings, cf. the Cost-of-Capital rate used by the Swiss regulator in its Solvency Test for BBB-rated reference undertakings.

As part of the QIS4-feedback, questions have been raised regarding the appropriateness of the assumed Cost-of-Capital rate of 6 per cent.

Especially, reference was made to the work carried out by the Chief Risk Officer Forum (CRO Forum), and a substantially lower Cost-of-Capital rate has been indicated (cf. also section 3.1.2.2 above).

However, a critical analysis of the CRO Forum’s report – as well as other reports on this issue – does not support the QIS4-feedback referred to above.
 
On the contrary, indicates that an assumed Cost-of-Capital of 6 per cent or higher could be seen as appropriate – given the information currently available regarding this issue.
 
In this context it should be noted that although the CRO Forum has indicated in its report that its research suggests a Cost-of-Capital rate in the range of 2 ½ - 4 ½ per cent, it also acknowledges that its research did not prove conclusive.
 
Moreover, it seems that the CRO Forum first and foremost has focussed on results leading to the lowest estimates of the Cost-of-Capital rate.

The analysis summarised in the following subsection does not discuss the required periodical review as referred to in Article 76(5) of the Level 1 text.
 
However, CEIOPS points out that the frequency and procedures to be followed for this review would need to be developed.
 
A possible approach could be to test the appropriateness of the Cost-of-Capital rate every five years.
 
In this context, it should be stressed that due to the long-term nature of the Cost-of-Capital rate, this does not necessarily mean that the rate has to be changed as a consequence of a periodic review.

Assessment of the Cost-of-Capital Rate
(a) Introductory remarks

The Cost-of-Capital rate is an annual rate applied to a capital requirement in each period.
 
Because the assets covering the capital requirement themselves are assumed to be held in marketable securities, this rate does not account for the total return but merely for the spread over and above the risk free rate.

The risk margin shall guarantee that sufficient technical provisions for a transfer are available even in a stressed scenario.
 
Hence, the Cost-of-Capital rate has to be a long-term average rate, reflecting both periods of stability and periods of stress.
 
Otherwise, the rate would vary from year to year, and would be higher in times of economic uncertainty (when providers of capital would be expected to seek greater returns for the comparatively higher risk) and would therefore contribute to higher technical provisions than in more stable economic situations.

A rate of at least 6 per cent is assessed to be an adequate placeholder for the Cost-of-Capital rate in the current context of the Solvency II regulation.
 
In order to reach this conclusion it may be argued along the following lines:

• Shareholder return models provide the initial input.

• Some objective criteria may cause upward and downward adjustments of the initial input.

• A final calibration of the Cost-of-Capital rate, in order to obtain risk margins consistent with observable prices in the marketplace, may be necessary.

(b) Funding of the capital requirement

In CRO Forum’s report, the Cost-of-Capital rate is calculated as a weighted average of the cost of equity and the cost of debt.
 
It is assumed that 20 per cent of the capital requirement can be funded by issuing debt and that only the remaining 80 per cent have to be funded by raising equity capital.
 
Moreover, by assuming an effective company rate of taxation of 35 per cent over all jurisdictions, the estimated cost of debt is in practise outweighed by the adjustments for tax relief on interest payments made to service the debt.
 
As a result the Cost-of-Capital rate equals only approximately 80 per cent of the estimated cost of equity rate.

It should be noted that the assumed funding based on 80 per cent equity and 20 per cent debt cannot be justified in light of the feedback received during the QIS4-exercise.
 
According to the QIS4-report the participating undertakings reported that 95 per cent of their own funds are classified as tier 1 capital of which only 2 per cent are classified as “subordinated loans” and only 4 per cent as “other reserves (with restricted loss absorbency)”.

Moreover, only 50 per cent of the tier 2 and tier 3 capital are classified as subordinated loans or other hybrid capital.
 
Consequently, the QIS4-results indicate clearly that the assumed debt-funding in any case cannot constitute more than 6-8 per cent of the capital base.

Moreover, it may be referred to the high-level political guidance to increase the quality of the external funding (subordinated loans, hybrid capital instruments etc.) of financial institutions.
 
It follows from this that subordinated loans and hybrid capital should have a high loss-absorbing capacity rather similar to “core” capital, cf. the revision carried out in the banking sector.
 
Accordingly, it seems reasonable to expect the cost-differences between equity funding and allowed external funding to diminish.

In this context it should also be stressed that since the capital base is defined as the solvency capital requirement in an adverse situation, i.e. as the amount of capital that is substantially at risk, it would be inconsistent to assume at the same time that this requirement can be funded by debt investors at costs substantially below equity.

With respect to the assumed impact of taxation (i.e. the tax relief on interest payments) on the assessment of the Cost-of-Capital rate, this aspect will be less important than assumed in CRO Forum’s report due to the QIS4-feedback referred to in paragraph 3.102 above.
 
However, it still remains to decide on the tax rate(s) to be used if a more detailed analysis of this aspect of the Cost-of-Capital calculations should be carried out.

Based on the considerations given in the previous paragraphs CEIOPS finds that an approach based on the market situation (i.e. the actual combination of equity and debt funding) leads to conclusions similar to the approach used up to now (i.e. 100 per cent equity funding), in particular for the purposes of the assessments summarised in subsection (c) below.
 
Calculation of the risk margin
The general approach
Based on the assumptions laid down for the reference undertaking and the assessment regarding the Cost-of-Capital rate referred to in sections above, a general approach for the risk margin calculations according to the
Cost-of-Capital methodology can be summarised as shown in paragraphs below.

It follows from assumption 8 regarding the reference undertaking that the risk margin should be calculated per line of business and that no diversification effects should be taken into account.
 
This means that
 
 
According to assumption 2 and 3 laid down for the reference undertaking, this undertaking is empty before a transfer of (re)insurance obligations takes place, whereas it after the transfer has eligible own funds corresponding
exactly to the SCR that is necessary to support the transferred (re)insurance obligations.
 
This means that the reference undertaking at time t = 0 (when the transfer takes place) will capitalise itself to the
required level of eligible own funds, i.e.
 
 
The cost of providing this amount of eligible own funds equals the Cost-of-Capital rate times the amount.

An assessment as sketched in the previous paragraph applies to the eligible own funds that the reference undertaking needs to provide in all future years, in order “to support the insurance and reinsurance obligations over the lifetime thereof” (Article 76(5)).

As the transfer of (re)insurance obligations is assumed to take place immediately (cf. Article 76(3)), the method for calculating the overall risk margin can in general terms be expressed in the following manner:
 
The Cost-of-Capital rate “shall be the same for all insurance and reinsurance undertakings” (Article 76(5)). According to CEIOPS’ view this rate should be fixed to 6 per cent (or higher), cf. the assessment made in the
previous sub-section.
 
However, a reservation should be made with respect to the outcome of the periodic reviews to be carried out.
The general rules for calculating the risk margin as laid down in the previous paragraphs should apply to all undertakings irrespective of whether the calculation of the SCR of the (original) undertaking is based on the standard formula or an internal model.
Calculations based on the standard formula
3.128. If the SCR of the (original) undertaking is calculated using the standard formula, all SCRs (for t ≥ 0) for a given line of business should be calculated as follows:
 
 
It should be ensured that the assumptions made regarding loss absorbing capacity of technical provisions that need to be taken into account in the SCR-calculations per line of business, are consistent with the assumptions made for the overall portfolio (of the original undertaking).

The Basic SCRs for a given line of business (i.e. BSCRRU,lob(t) for all t ≥ 0) should be calculated by using the relevant SCR-modules and sub-modules per line of business (meaning that the input to be used in the relevant modules should be restricted to the line of business in question).

Moreover, the calculation of the Basic SCRs (as referred to in para. 3.128) should be based on the correlation assumptions laid down in Annex IV of the Level 1 text although only the unavoidable market risk and the counterparty default risk with respect to ceded reinsurance is taken into consideration.

It should be noted that to the extent that market risk can be considered avoidable for a line of business (either from the very beginning (i.e. from t = 0) or after some years (i.e. from t ≥ t*)), the calculation of the Basic SCR would be
simplified. Further simplifications may arise if the underwriting risk of a given
line of business is confined to only one of the three modules
for this risk. 
 
Risk Margin in the QIS4
 
Risk Margin in the QIS5
 
CEIOPS Advice for Level 2 Implementing Measures on Solvency II: Technical Provisions – Article 86 (d) Calculation of the Risk Margin